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This article explores geopolitical rivalry in the Caspian Basin, driven in large measure by
the desire to control and exploit energy resources. It focuses in particular on actions by
Russia, China, and the United States. While outside actors play an important role in the
region, local states have demonstrated that they are not merely passive players. They have
managed, in many cases, to use the ‘geopolitical pluralism’ of great power competition to
gain room to maneuver. The result is a complicated picture of geopolitical balance. Looking
ahead, however, China may be in the best position to assume the pre-eminent role in the
region.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.The former Soviet republics of Central Asia and the
Caspian basin have assumed prominence in Eurasian and
global affairs for a number of reasons. Much of their activity
and importance in global markets is concentrated in energy
production. While the region has been affected by the
global ﬁnancial crisis of the late 2000s because of falling
energy prices and economic malaise in primary export
markets (e.g. Russia, China, Europe), there is little question
that the region’s energy reserves will make it a continued
target for investment by corporations and geopolitical
competition among states looking to control and exploit
new sources of energy.arch Center, Hanyang
sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, HaThis article focuses on both cooperative and competitive
aspects of the politics of energy in the Caspian basin.1 By
necessity, it will overlap with more general discussions of
the foreign policies of various Eurasian states and it will
also make reference to other geopolitical or security issues
that affect the calculations of domestic and international
actors with regard to developing and exploiting the re-
gion’s hydrocarbons. Its goals are to examine the nature of
outside involvement in the region, to point to the increas-
ingly active role of local actors, and to assess trends for
future development.1 Henceforth I will employ this term, rather than Central Asia, to
designate this region, as most of the oil and gas deposits are scattered
around the Caspian Sea. This term, unlike Central Asia, allows us to
include Azerbaijan, a major energy producer, and Georgia, an important
transit route. Our discussion will at times include Uzbekistan, which,
while not a Caspian littoral state, does have some signiﬁcant energy re-
sources. By energy, I focus on oil and gas reserves, not hydroelectric
(important in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) or uranium (signiﬁcant in
Uzbekistan) deposits.
nyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Table 1
Oil and gas reserves in the Caspian region.
Country Oil reserves in billions of barrels Gas reserves in
trillions of cubic feet
Proven Possible Total Proven Possible Total
Azerbaijan 7–12.5 32 39–44.5 30 35 65
Kazakhstan 9–29 92 101–132 65 88 153
Turkmenistan 0.5–1.7 38 38.5–39.7 71 159 230
Uzbekistan 0.3–0.6 2 2.3–2.6 66 35 101
Russiaa 0.3 7 7.3 n/a n/a n/a
Irana 0.1 15 15 0 11 11
Total 17.2–44.2 186 203.2–235.2 232 328 560
a These ﬁgures represent only reserves in the Caspian Sea, not the
country’s total reserves. Source: Energy Information Administration of the
United States Department of Energy, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/
cabs/caspian_balances.htm, accessed on December 5, 2010. Data reﬂect
ﬁndings as of 2006, and include high and low ﬁgures for “proven”
reserves.
Table 2
Production of oil and gas in the Caspian region.
Country Oil production, thousands
of barrel/day
Gas production, trillion
cubic feet per year
1992 2000 2005 2011 1992 2000 2005 2011
Azerbaijan 222 309 440 989 0.28 0.20 0.18 0.75
Kazakhstan 529 718 1293 1640 0.29 0.31 0.84 1.39
Turkmenistan 110 157 196 223 2.02 1.89 2.08 2.34
Uzbekistan 66 152 125 105 1.51 1.99 1.97 2.23
Total 927 1336 2054 2957 3.10 3.39 5.07 6.71
Source: Source: Energy Information Administration of the United States
Department of Energy, at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Caspian/
images/Caspian_balances.pdf, accessed on 13 July 2007, and 2011 data
from International Energy Statistics at http://www.tinyurl.com/bfvq5j8,
accessed 21 January 2013.
2 As of 2010, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan have signed agree-
ments regarding their sectors of the Caspian, allowing energy exploration
in the northern and western sections of the sea. Iran and Turkmenistan,
however, have not signed agreements with the other littoral states.
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resources
Before going further, however, it might be useful to step
back and establish precisely what is at stake in the Caspian
Basin. Estimates of total oil and gas reserves in the region
vary widely, as many experts speculate that only a fraction
of the hydrocarbon deposits have actually been found.
However, since the early 1990sdwhen “Caspian fever” ﬁrst
struckdnew discoveries of oil (e.g. the Kashagan ﬁelds in
Kazakhstan) and gas (the Shah Deniz ﬁeld off the coast of
Azerbaijan) have pushed the total of “proven” reserves up.
Table 1 shows the estimates, for energy deposits around the
Caspian littoral and Uzbekistan. To put these ﬁgures in
perspective, the proven oil reserves of the entire region are
under a third of those for Iran or Iraq; the proven gas re-
serves are about half as much as Qatar’s. If one considers,
however, possible reservesdespecially taking into account
that because of the unsettled legal status of the Caspian
that much of it remains unexploreddthe totals become far
more impressive, comparable (at the high end) to the
proven reserves of Saudi Arabia or the proven reserves of
Iran and Iraq combined. As for gas, Turkmenistan’s total
possible reserves equal the proven reserves of Saudi Arabia,
and the total possible reserves for the region as a whole
equal the proven reserves of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and the
United Arab Emirates combined. Clearly, some early pro-
nouncements of a “new Persian Gulf” might have been
exaggerated, but, considering that potential oil reserves are
more than the proven reserves of Venezuela, Nigeria, Libya,
and Norway combined, one is discussing a major addition
to world energy markets.
In addition, because energy production in the region is
expected to grow substantially, its importance in the
global economy will only increase. Table 2 shows the
trend in production levels for several post-Soviet states.
Note that growth levels in the 1990s were not that
impressive, as well as the fact that roughly half of the oil
production in the region in the early 2000s was coming
from three sites (Kazakhstan’s Tengiz and Karachaganak
ﬁelds and Azerbaijan’s off-shore ACG Megastructure
ﬁelds). With investments that are beginning to pay divi-
dends, new discoveries of more reserves, additionalpipelines, most projections for growth are very impres-
sive. If the legal status of the Caspian is fully resolved,2
still more sites could be explored. Not surprisingly,
obtaining a share of this bountydby investment in pro-
duction or control over transitdhas become an important
focus both for multinational companies and national
governments.
2. The main players in the Caspian energy scramble
While powerful states and energy companies are always
on the lookout for new oil and gas ﬁelds, the hydrocarbon
resources in the Caspian basin have become a source for
international political and economic competition for three
main reasons. First, the post-Soviet states in the region,
which suffered from years of neglect while under Soviet
rule, were in dire need of technology and capital in order to
exploit their resource bounty. Simply put, outside
involvement was seen as crucial to the success of the Cas-
pian project, a fact that was recognized even in the late
1980s when Chevron began negotiating for rights to
develop the Tengiz oil ﬁelds in Soviet Kazakhstan.
Secondly, the Caspian basin is landlocked, dependent
upon pipelines or shipping arrangements through neigh-
boring states to get oil and gas to global consumers. At the
time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the only pipe-
lines from Soviet lands went north to Russia: an oil pipeline
from Baku to the Russian port of Novorossiysk on the Black
Sea; an oil pipeline from Kazakhstan that connected to the
Russian pipeline network; and the Central Asia Center gas
pipeline that took gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and
Kazakhstan to Russia. Upgrading these pipelines ordas was
the preference of many outside and local actorsdbuilding
new ones became a top priority, but one that would require
a lot of capital as well as political stability in regions (e.g.
Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya, Afghanistan,
southeastern Turkey, Xinjiang province in China) that have
seen much violence in recent years.
Third, Caspian states were not very powerful. Newly
independent, with uncertain sources of domestic
P. Kubicek / Journal of Eurasian Studies 4 (2013) 171–180 173legitimacy, weak militaries, poorly functioning economies,
and potential for civil or external conﬂict, some outside
actorsdparticularly Russiadthought they could be easily
manipulated from the outside. Russia’s rivals at times also
saw them as objects to be won in geopolitical competition.
While these states are still in many ways dependent upon
the outside world, one theme that has developed over time
is their success in securing their political independence and
increasingly exercising choices to chart their own geopo-
litical course.7 Zviagelskaia, 1995.2.1. Russian objectives: maintain dominance
As the largest successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia
was well-positioned to play a dominant role in the Caspian
basin. Even though the various “stans” were now inde-
pendent states, they retained important political, economic,
security, and even cultural ties to Moscow. At the end 1991,
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was
cobbled together to facilitate a civilized divorce among the
post-Soviet successor states, and all the states in the
regiondsave Georgiadembraced it as a means to prevent
chaos, conﬂict, and economic collapse. In terms of energy,
all remained tied to old Soviet structures, which meant,
among other things, reliance upon the Soviet electrical grid,
aforementioned oil and gas pipelines, and ethnic Russian
personnel to manage their economic enterprises. Few of the
political leaders in the region had been enthusiastic about
independence, andmaintaining good ties withMoscowwas
seen as a means, at least initially, to preserve their power.
Whereas Russia had a strong hand to play, in the early
1990s it was not excessively involved in the affairs of
Central Asia and the Caspian basin.3 Moscow initially was
intent on charting a course of Westernization and
approached most of the regionwith what might be dubbed
a policy of benign neglect. According to Aleksandr Livshits,
“Some members of the Russian leadership believed that it
was necessary to dispose of Central Asia as soon as possible
since it would supposedly retard the implementation of
economic reform in Russia.”4 There was little push for
closer economic or political cooperation and in the realm of
energy. Rather, it remained more or less business as usual,
with oil and gas ﬂowing north through Russian pipelines,
which conveniently meant that Russia controlled the eco-
nomic lifeline of the region.5 Although there was a clear
recognition of the signiﬁcance of the region’s oil and gas
deposits, in the initial post-Soviet years this factor did not
take on immense political importance, and oil production
actually declined from 1991 to 1995.6 Indeed, as Irina
Zviagelskaia notes, Kazakhstan remained on Russian3 A good source for this early period is Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian
Policy Debate on Central Asia (London: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1995).
4 Rossiyskaia gazeta, May 16, 2003.
5 Rose Marie Forsythe, The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
6 Gulshan Sachdeva, “Joint Ventures and Export Routes in the Caspian
Sea Region,” in Geopolitics and Energy Resources in Central Asia and Cas-
pian Sea Region, ed. Shams-Ud-Din, (New Delhi: Lancers Books, 2000), p.
135.policymakers’ radar screen more than did other states, but
chieﬂy because of its large ethnic Russian population, not
its large oil and gas reserves.7
This policy changed in the mid-1990s, reﬂecting a
broader shift in Russian foreign policy away from West-
ernization and toward a “Monroeski Doctrine,” a policy
that asserted special rights for Russia in the so-called
“near abroad” of the post-Soviet space.8 This took
various forms: support for separatists in Abkhazia against
Georgia, which was coerced to join the CIS in 1993; aid to
the Karabakh Armenians ﬁghting Azerbaijan and a
Moscow-supported coup against the pro-Western Azeri
President Abulfaz Elchibey; pressure on Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbaev, among the most pro-Russian of all
CIS leaders, to grant dual citizenship and other rights to
ethnic Russians. In the last case, the amount of Kazakh oil
that could ﬂow through Russian pipelines was limited and,
on a few occasions, shut off entirely, with the claim that
Kazakh oil was too sulfuric to be transported by the
Russian pipeline network.9 As for gas from Turkmenistan,
Russia controlled the main export route and was able to
set a low price for Turkmen gas and did not allow Turk-
men gas to be sold in Europe, meaning Ukraine became
the largest consumer for Turkmen gas. With low prices
creating disincentives for production, the output of Turk-
men gas in 2000, as seen in Table 2, was actually lower
than in 1992.
The reasons for this shift in Russian policy were many,
grounded in both international and Russian domestic pol-
itics.10 For our purposes, however, one factor stands out:
Russia’s fear of losing its position in a region that Moscow
previously simply assumed to be part of its sphere of in-
ﬂuence. This fear was not ungrounded. The CIS, which
Russia had tried to use to exercise its inﬂuence throughout
the post-Soviet space, wasweak. The constitutional crisis of
1993 and the war in Chechnya had made both Russia’s
neighbors and Western states nervous, and one began to
see, especially from the United States, movement away
from a Russia-ﬁrst policy. In concrete terms, this meant, as
discussed more below, more engagement by the United
States with other post-Soviet states, which in turn were
attracted by the prospect of political and economic support
from Washington. Many in Moscow, however, often
invoking the “Great Game” metaphor, viewed this devel-
opment in zero-sum terms – what was good for the West
was bad for Russia, and thus Russia had to respond
aggressively to foreign intrusions in the region and the
emergence of “geo-political pluralism.”118 The earliest reference to a “Monroeski Doctrine” that I can ﬁnd is by
Andranik Migranian, who became an adviser to Vladimir Putin, in Ros-
siiskaia gazeta, August 4, 1992.
9 Richard Pomfret, The Economies of Central Asia (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 157 and p. 191.
10 Peter Rutland, “Oil, Politics, and Foreign Policy,” in David Lane, ed. The
Political Economy of Russian Oil (Latham: Rowman and Littleﬁeld, 1999).
11 This term was used in Zbigniew Brzezinki, “The Premature Partner-
ship,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 73 (Summer 1994), p. 79, and was employed by
Russian writers Andranik Migranian and Konstantin Zatulin, “SNG Posle
Kishineva: Nachalo Kontsa Istorii,” Sodruzhestvo NG, December 1997, pp.
1–2.
13 RFE/RL Newsline, January 29 2001.
14 D. Malysheva, “Rossiyskaia karta v kaspiyskom pas’ianse,” Mirovaia
ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, July 2002, pp. 53–54.
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both Russian ﬁrms and the Russian state became more
active in the region. Regarding ownership and investment,
Russia at that time did not have the capital to match
Western ﬁrms and governments, although many in Mos-
cow no doubt would have preferred to limit or prohibit
foreign investment in Caspian energy projects. Whereas
Western ﬁrms took the leading role in some major projects
(e.g. the Tengiz ﬁelds in Kazakhstan), Russian ﬁrms were
not shut out. For example, Lukoil gained a 10 percent stake
in the $8 billion 1994 “deal of the century” Azerbaijani
Consortium, a 32.5 percent share of Azerbaijan’s offshore
Karabakh ﬁeld, a 10 percent stake in the Shah Deniz ﬁelds,
and shares in the Kumkol-Lukoil and Tengizchevroil pro-
jects in Kazakhstan. Gazprom was included in plans to
exploit the Karachaganak ﬁeld in Kazakhstan. According to
many observers, Russian ﬁrms often were invited in
because excluding them would have been impolitic and
would risk sanctions fromMoscow (for example, the denial
of exports through Russian pipelines), and in some cases
they won shares gratis. Even so, the Russian foreign min-
istry condemned major deals such as the Azerbaijani Con-
sortium as illegitimate because the legal status of the
Caspian in the 1990s was still unresolved. However, given
the fact that Russian ﬁrms at that time had only small
stakes in the main projects and that literally dozens of
states and ﬁrms were invested in the region, throughout
the early post-Soviet period Russia had, in ownership
terms, a rather modest presence in the region.12
The same cannot be said of the pipeline issue, a concern
that has been central to energy policy in the region because
the Caspian states are landlocked. As previously
mentioned, when the Soviet Union broke up, all existing
pipelines from the region headed north and connected
with the Russian pipeline network. This situation was
viewed unfavorably by many both in the West and in the
Caspian region, and thus by the mid 1990s a constant
refrain in discussions of the region was the need to
construct new pipelines to transport oil and gas from the
region. The issue, of course, had an obvious geopolitical
component: what state or states should these pipelines
traverse? Many schemes were put forward, including
routes across China, Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan, Russia,
and Iran.
In the end, as noted below, the region did acquire
multiple pipelines, and plans exist to send Caspian oil and
gas to all directions of the compass. Whereas the Russian
monopoly on the export of energy was broken in the late
1990s when a small-scale pipeline between Baku and the
Georgian port of Supsa became operational and a gas
pipeline opened between Turkmenistan and Iran, major
export routes continue to traverse Russian territory. For
example, the Russian government secured a 24 percent
stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which built
a large-volume (560,000 barrels/day) pipeline from
Kazakhstan’s Tengiz ﬁelds to the Russian port of Novor-
ossiysk on the Black Sea. This pipeline opened in 2001 and
through 2010 remained the largest single oil pipeline out of12 Sachdeva, 2000.the region with potential to double its capacity to over 1.3
million barrels a day. One problem, though, is that oil
through this pipeline reaches global markets after being
shipped through the crowded and dangerous Bosphorus
Straits, a sore point with Turkey.
The accession of Vladimir Putin to the Russian presi-
dency in 2000 and Russia’s vigorous economic recover-
ydfueled in large part by its own oil and gas exports and
the increase in the price of energydadded new assertive-
ness to Russian foreign policy. He stated that the countries
of the CIS would be “our absolute priority.”13 He appointed
Viktor Kaliuzhny, a former energy minister, as a special
representative of the president on Caspian issues, and Putin
visited several states in the region to urge more Russian
involvement in energy development. In July 2000, perhaps
in response to directives from the Kremlin, Lukoil, Yukos,
and Gazprom formed the Caspian Oil Company to develop
new oil and gas ﬁelds on both the Russian part of the shelf
and in neighboring states.14 Putin intensiﬁed Russian at-
tempts to settle the legal status of the Caspian Sea, a ven-
ture that bore fruit in 2001–2002 with the conclusion of
preliminary agreements with both Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan that divided the seabed for economic develop-
ment. Putin also proposed increasing oil and gas shipments
from the region through Russian pipelines in an effort to
prevent construction of alternative pipelines. Noting
Putin’s “bustling energy diplomacy,” one observer noted
that Russia had “new and newly invigorated goals to win
the high-stakes competition for energy deals and favorable
transportation routes.Moscow’s adroit policy [in the
Caspian] is likely to reap dividends, resulting in consoli-
dated ties with Kazakhstan and possibly a major warming
of relations with Azerbaijan.”15
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent battle
against the Taliban put Central Asia and the Caspian region
more squarely on the American radar screens, and Russia’s
expectation of remaining the pre-eminent power in the
region was cast into serious doubt. The United States
adopted a much more aggressive posture, including the
basing of soldiers in several post-Soviet states. Putin,
however, initially acquiesced to the greater US role, and
even former US National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brze-
zinski, ever suspicious of Russian actions, noted in
November 2001 that the “Russian elite is gradually shed-
ding its imperial nostalgia.”16
With respect to energy policy, the Russians adopted a
more targeted and softer approach. Azerbaijan, thanks to
Western investment and support for a pipeline that would
bring its oil westward, could no longer be bullied by Mos-
cow. Despite concerns that Kazakh oil would compete with
Russian oil on world markets, Lukoil, Gazprom, Rosneft,
and other Russian companies expanded their involvement
in exploratory projects on the Kazakh side of the Caspian15 Douglas Blum, “Russia’s New Caspian Policy,” PONARS Policy Memo
162, October 2000.
16 Newshour with Jim Lehrer, November 15, 2001.
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transit of Kazakh oil through Russian pipelines.17 Noting
these developments, Russian commentators suggested that
Kazakhstan, which had remained a “loyal bridgehead” for
Russia in the region, may prove to be closer to Russia than
the ostensibly “soiuznaia” Belarus.18 In 2003 Nazarbaev
spoke of an oil–gas alliance with Russia and maintained
that Russians and Kazakhs are “brothers in blood,”19 both of
which would be anathema to Azeri leaders. As for
Turkmenistan, Ashgabat remained largely isolated inter-
nationally allowing Russia to continue to dictate terms for
the transit of Turkmen gas.
2.2. American objectives: introduce diversity
The United States, while lacking the advantages of ge-
ography and history that favor Russian involvement in the
Caspian, gradually inserted itself into the region. While
initially the American government seemed content to let
the region remain Russia’s backyard, fears about Russia’s
intentions, lobbying by local actors, and the quest for
proﬁts, spurred American governmental and corporate
involvement.20 On the energy question, despite talk of
cooperation with Moscow, the United States “rejected
Russia’s claims for an energy monopoly . [by] seeking to
supplant the primacy of Russian afﬁliations with local
governments’ defence establishments and energy pro-
ducers. [and by trying] to compel Russia to accept a very
inferior position compared to Russia’s regional ambi-
tions.”21 Another observer noted that the United States
attempted to take advantage of a “unipolar moment” that
would allow the United States “to fashion relations in the
Caspian region so as to constrain Russian decision-making
with little or no blowback from Moscow.”22
US involvement assumed several dimensions. On the
investment side, American corporations (with, it should be
added, substantial assistance from British Gas and British
Petroleum) in the 1990s were “by far the lead players”23
on the investment side, obtaining substantial percent-
ages in major projects in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. For
example, Chevron (50 percent) and Exxonmobil (25
percent) were the main investors in Tengiz in Kazakhstan,
and Exxonmobil was the lead investor in the Nakhchivan,
Oguz, and Zafar ﬁelds in Azerbaijan. Four American com-
paniesdChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, Phillips, and Uno-
caldheld the largest “national share” (36 percent of the
total) in various production-sharing agreements signed in17 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 29 January 2003.
18 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 20 December 2002 and 7 February 2003.
19 Nezavisimaia gazeta, 20 February 2003.
20 Martha Brill Olcott, “Pipelines and Pipe Dreams: Energy Development
and Caspian Society,” Journal of International Affairs, vol. 53 (Fall 1999):
305–323.
21 Stephen Blank, “Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests,
Policies and Tactics in the Transcaspian Energy Wars,” Central Asian Sur-
vey 18:2, 1999, p. 152.
22 Douglas Blum, “Sustainable Development and the New Oil Boom:
Comparative and Competitive Outcomes in the Caspian Sea,” Working
paper, Davis Center for Russian Studies, Harvard University, 1997, p. 21.
23 Ian Bremmer, “Oil Politics: America and the Riches of the Caspian
Basin,” World Policy Journal 15:1, Spring 1998, p. 28.the 1990s.24 Interestingly, while some in the 1990s
thought that the uncertain legal status of the Caspiandthe
question boils down to whether it is a sea or a lake-
dwould scare off risk-adverse investors, several hundred
projects involving foreign investors are in the works, proof
that companies have been able to lobby local govern-
ments, buy off potential opponents (e.g. the Russians) and
count on US government support for their activity.25 A
more serious problem may be the rampant corruption in
the region, which, in addition to the requirement that
large bribes be paid to government ofﬁcials, has threat-
ened existing investments, evidenced by capricious
changes in tax or accounting laws and overt pressure to
force companies to cede their shares to politically-
connected local groups.26
Secondly, the US made the construction of new pipe-
lines that would bypass Russia a major foreign policy
priority. After weighing various optionsdroutes through
Iran were rejected outright, a trans-Afghan gas pipeline
was too risky (although American corporations did try to
court the Taliban27), and expanding exports through
Supsa ran against Turkish objections over clogging the
Bosphorusdthe Americans (together with the Turks)
became the primary backers of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan
(BTC) pipeline, which would take Azeri oil (and poten-
tially Kazakh oil) through Georgia and onward to the
Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. Running
over one thousand miles and costing $3 billion, this was
an immense project, skirting through or nearby such
geopolitical hotspots as Nagorno-Karabakh, Chechnya,
Abkhazia, and southeastern Turkey. With such risks, there
was difﬁculty in attracting investors, but, with the overt
support of Washington (which sent military forces to
Georgia to bolster that state’s stability) and Ankara, a
consortium led by British Petroleum and the Azeri State
Oil Company, eventually started construction in 2003. It
went on-line in 2006 and its capacitydupgrades would
allow it to export over a million barrels of oil a day by
2009dcould potentially send all Azeri oil westward,
effectively taking Azerbaijan out of the Russian and into
the American sphere of inﬂuence.28 The larger ques-
tiondcovered more belowdwas what effect BTC would
have on Kazakhstan, the “bigger prize” as the largest oil
producer in the region, as some hoped to build an un-
dersea trans-Caspian pipeline so that Kazakh oil could
ﬂow into the BTC.
Elsewhere, US involvement was more limited. There
was no easy way to get access to Turkmen gas, and the24 Ian Rutledge, Addicted to Oil: America’s Relentless Drive for Energy
Security (London: IB Tauris, 2001), p. 110.
25 Ilya Bourtman, “No Borders, No Problem: Why the Lack of a Legal
Framework in the Caspian Sea is not Affecting Energy Exploration,” SAIS
Review 26:1, Winter-Spring 2006: 109–110.
26 Seymour Hersh, “The price of oil,” The New Yorker, 9 July 2001, and
Rutledge, 2005, pp. 112–114. In 2002, government actions compelled
TengizChevrOil to debate suspending further investment in Kazakhstan.
27 Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in
Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001).
28 Maurice Walsh, “Oil rolls back the former Soviet borders,” New
Statesman, 15 September 2003. This occurred even though the Freedom
Support Act of 1992 prohibited most direct US aid to Azerbaijan.
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menbashi”) did not endear himself to Washington or
American investors. There was an effort to get
Turkmenistan to sign onto a trans-Caspian gas pipeline that
would have taken its gas to Azerbaijan and then Turkey, but
the unresolved status of the Caspian seabed, together with
Niyazov’s own eccentricities, prevented this project from
getting off the ground. Uzbekistan, although an important
geopolitical prize in the aftermath of 9/11, was also elusive
in terms of energy projects, primarily because the lack of
economic reform in the country did not create a good in-
vestment climate.2.3. Chinese objectives: grab a piece of the pie
While some in the Caspian looked westward, there was
still another direction they could go: east, to China. By the
1990s, China was becoming a major player in the world
economy, both a source for investment and a potential
market for purveyors of oil and gas.
China, however, was relatively slow to enter the
competition for the energy resources of the region. Part of
the problemwas historical: the Silk Road vanished long ago
and links to China were severely limited during Soviet
times. Part of it was economic: until 1993, China was an
exporter of oil. Part of it was geographic: abutting the
eastern edge of Central Asia, China was relatively far from
the main energy ﬁelds of the Caspian Basin. Rather than
making an immediate bid in the energy sector, initial Chi-
nese interest in the region was couched primarily in secu-
rity terms, in particular preventing Islamic fundamentalism
and terrorism among Uighurs in its Xinjiang region that
borders Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In 1996, China
launched the Shanghai Five (which became the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization [SCO] in 2001), which eventually
brought together Russia and four Central Asian states
(neutral Turkmenistan did not participate) to work on se-
curity issues.29
While Chinese interest in the energy reserves of the
region was no doubt rising throughout the 1990s, actual
Chinese involvement was relatively modest. In 1997, the
Chinese National Petroleum Company signed a deal to
construct an 1800 mile pipeline that would traverse
Kazakhstan and the Tienshan mountain range and end in
Xinjiang. Securing investment funds and working out
logistical problems (e.g. the nationality of the construction
workers) delayed realization of this project. Meanwhile, it
was only in 2003 that Chinese companies made their ﬁrst
deal with the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan, investing in
a small ($140 million) in-shore project. At the same time,
however, Chinese plans to purchase stakes in a British Gas-
led consortium for the immense Kashagan ﬁeld in
Kazakhstan were scuttled, in part because Western ﬁrms
such as Shell, Total, and ExxonMobil were against Chinese
participation in the project.3029 Those interested in the SCO are urged to look at the contribution by in
this volume.
30 Mark Berniker, “China’s Hunger for Central Asian Energy,” Asia Times
Online, 11 June 2003.2.4. Other players in the game
The potential energy bonanza in the Caspian basin has
attracted a number of other actors, although none of them
has been able to exert the inﬂuence of the larger powers
discussed above.
The EuropeanUnion (EU), European states, andEuropean
ﬁrms have been active in the region. Among companies,
British Petroleum has been the leading investor in several
projects (including the BTC and Shah Deniz ﬁelds) in
Azerbaijan, and other companies such as Royal Dutch Shell,
British Gas, Total (France), and Agip and Eni (Italy) have
invested in oil and gas ﬁelds in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan,
with Eni taking the leading role in the massive ($29 billion)
Kashagan project. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as noted
with respect to the United States, are less amenable to
outside investors, as evidencedbya2001production sharing
agreement between Britain’s Trinity Energy and Uzbek
partners that was broken off in 2005with acrimony on both
sides. European governments have given their support to
private investment, and for the most part have allied
themselves withWashington in terms of trying to introduce
greater diversity (e.g. less Russia) in the region, although
they have been on balance more sensitive to environmental
questions surrounding construction of new pipelines. Geo-
strategically, members of the EU are very interested in
diversifying their ownenergy sources, as they rely at present
on Russia for approximately 30% of their oil and gas, and, as
the gas crisis in 2005–2006 between Russia and Ukraine
demonstrated, control over gas gives Russia a strong card to
play with gas consuming countries. The EU has created a
Transit Corridor Europe–Caucasus–Asia Program and an
Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe Program to pro-
vide technical assistance, integrate oil and gas pipeline
networks, and support investors.31 The EU, together with
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, has lobbied to
put Caspian oil in a pipeline that runs from the Ukrainian
port of Odessa northward to the Polish border and also
supports the so-called “Nabucco”gaspipeline (namedaftera
Verdi opera) that would ship gas from the Caspian Region-
dprimarily from Azerbaijandto Central Europe via Turkey.
Both of these plans have faced difﬁculties: the Russians have
managed to make oil in the Odessa–Brody pipeline ﬂow
southward to the Black Sea and, although construction on
Nabucco is set to begin in 2010,Gazprom’s involvementwith
the Austrian and Hungarian state gas companies could
throw a wrench into the project.32 European investors are
also under pressure in Kazakhstan, where changes in the tax
laws seem to be targeted against foreign investors and the
environmental card has been played on investors in the
Kashagan ﬁeld, which are led by Italy’s Eni. The later move,
some suggest, echoes Russia’s campaign that forced Shell to
sell its stakes in the Sakhalin II project.33
Among regional powers, Iran is an important player,
although it has been hobbled on two accounts: its failure to31 Robert Cutler, “The Caspian Energy Conundrum,” Journal of Interna-
tional Affairs 56:2, Spring 2003, pp. 99–100.
32 Wall Street Journal, 9 August 2007.
33 New York Times, 22 August 2007.
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on the Russians) has limited off-shore Iranian exploration
and the threat of American sanctions has scared awaymajor
foreign investment. Still, the Iranians have tried to play
“pipeline politics,” lobbying other Caspian states to develop
a southern export route that would, Iranians argue, be less
costly than any other option.34 At present it is engaging in
small-scale oil swaps (e.g. 30,000 barrels a day with
Kazakhstan), but it is upgrading its port, pipelines, and re-
ﬁneries in Neka on the Caspian to process up to 500,000
barrels a day.35With Turkmenistan, Iran in 1997 opened the
Korpezhe–Kurt Kui pipeline that has the capacity to handle
300 billion cubic feet of Turkmen gas a year.
Turkey had high hopes that it would be able to take
advantage of its culture (Azeris, Turkmen, Kazakhs, and
Uzbeks are all Turkic peoples) and example of a successful,
modern state to exert a major inﬂuence in the region.36 By
and large, this has not been realized: Turkish construction
ﬁrms do well, but on major energy projects Caspian states
seem to prefer American, European, and Russian investors.
BTC does connect Turkey to the region, but most of Turkey’s
own gas needs are being met through pipelines from
Russia, including the “Blue Stream” pipeline under the
Black Sea which went on-line in November 2005. The
Turks, however, have shown continued interest in pur-
chasing Azeri gas. In 2007, Turkey agreed to participate in
the Nabucco pipeline, and an oil pipeline from Samsun on
the Black Sea to Ceyhan is also in the works, offering
another means for Russian or potentially Caspian oil to get
to Western markets while avoiding the Bosphorous.
India and Pakistan, both with rising energy needs, are
also involved in investments and “pipeline politics.” Most
signiﬁcantly, both have backed a trans-Afghan gas pipeline
from Turkmenistan to the Indian Ocean, an idea that
seemed fanciful when the Taliban controlled Kabul but may
be more realistic now that the Taliban is out of power.37
India has also made deals with Iran for the supply of liq-
ueﬁed natural gas and rights to develop two Iranian oil
ﬁelds and is interested in a gas pipeline from Iran that
would traverse Pakistan.383. Developments in the 2000s and future prospects
9/11 looked to change everything in Central Asia and the
Caspian Basin. America was strong and closely involved in
the affairs of many states. Russia, despite occasional blus-
tering from its president, was on the defensive. Chinese
involvement remained more prospective than actual.
However, events have not transpired as those in
Washington hoped or those in Moscow feared. Russia34 Rasizade, 2003, p. 57.
35 Energy Information Administration (EIA), Rasizade, 2003, p. 57.
36 Paul Kubicek, Nation, State, and Economy in Central Asia: Does Ata-
turk Provide a Model? (Treadgold Papers, University of Washington,
1997).
37 The American ﬁrm Unocal announced preliminary agreement to build
this pipeline, but sufﬁce to say that security conditions in Afghanistan
through 2009 bode against its construction.
38 Stephen Blank, “Central Asia’s Energy Game Intensiﬁes,” Eurasianet.
org, September 1, 2005.would not and could not simply disappear from the scene.
In the words of Askar Akayev, former President of
Kyrgyzstan, “God and geography gave us Russia.”39 How-
ever, Russia’s re-emergence was not geographically or
otherwise pre-determined. Instead, the authoritarian and
corrupt leaders of the region, uneasy with Washington’s
democratization agenda (which included support for the
Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in
Ukraine, and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan) and
comforted by Russian (and Chinese) tolerance for political
repression, gradually pulled back from engagement with
the United States in broad geopolitical terms and in relation
the development of energy resources. Writing in 2005,
Martha Brill Olcott argued that US inﬂuence “shows clear
signs of having peaked.”40 For example, Uzbekistan, which
seemed to be the top US ally in the region in 2001, turned
toward Russia in 2005 after a violent crackdown killed
hundreds of anti-government protesters in the city of
Andijan which prompted criticism from the West, and
Turkmenistan, after squabbles with Russia in the early
2000s over the status of ethnic Russians in Turkmenistan,
concluded major energy deals with Russia after Ashgabat
experienced a change in leadership in late 2006. The
following sections detail important developments with
respect to the three pre-eminent outside powers in the
region: Russia, the United States, and China.
3.1. Russia strives to comeback
In the 2000s Russia re-emerged as the pre-eminent
outside actor in the region, both with respect to security
policy (e.g. expanding military cooperation with local
states, a larger naval presence in the Caspian, access to
military bases, a more assertive military doctrine41) and in
energy. Moreover, given its willingness to play the “gas
card” in its dealings with pro-Western governments in
Georgia and Ukraine, veiled threats toward Europe with
respect to gas supplies, and its military incursion into
Georgia in August 2008, one can say that the Russian “bear”
is back.42
Whereas western governments celebrated the (under-
utilized) BTC, the Russians have moved to enhance their
position as a conduit for Caspian hydrocarbons. Plans have
been made to upgrade the CPC, which seems likely to be
the main export route for Kazakh oil into the foreseeable
future. Recognizing that the old Black Sea toMediterranean
route via the Bosphorous is problematic, the Russians took
the lead on development of the Burgas–Alexandroupoli
pipeline, which would allow Russian and, presumably
Caspian oil to bypass the Turkish straits by taking an
overland route across Bulgaria and Greece. As for Ukrainian
plans to utilize the Odessa–Brody pipeline for Caspian oil, it39 Quoted in Weitz, 2006, p. 156.
40 Martha Brill Olcott, “The Great Powers in Central Asia,” Current His-
tory, October 2005, p. 331.
41 Roy Allison, “Strategic reassertion in Russia’s Central Asian policy,”
International Affairs 80:2, 2004: 277–293.
42 Analysis of energy policy toward Europe in Michael Emerson et al.,
eds. The Elephant and the Bear Try Again (Brussels: Centre for European
Policy Studies, 2006).
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Ultimately, in 2004, the Ukrainians agreed to reverse the
ﬂow, meaning the transported Russian oil southward to-
ward Odessa.
Meanwhile, Russia tried to improve relations with Cas-
pian energy producers. In the case of Kazakhstan, the
Russians and Kazakhs reached agreement over expanding
the capacity of the CPC and sending Kazakh oil through the
Burgas–Alexandroupolsi pipeline. Although the plan to put
some Kazakh oil on barges and then deposit it into the BTC
has not been totally abandoned, the planned export of
Kazakh oil through Russia may, in the words of one report,
give Russia a “unbreakable stranglehold over Central Asia’s
energy reserves” and spell the end of US and European-
backed plans to build a trans-Caspian oil pipeline.43 At a
time when no major deals have been announced with
Western companies, Russian and Kazakh ﬁrms agreed to
production-sharing agreements on potentially large oil
ﬁelds such as Kurmangazy, Tscentralnoye, and Tyub-
Karagan.
With respect to Turkmenistan, Russia can claim two
major “victories.” In 2005, Russia concluded a twenty-ﬁve
year agreement to purchase Turkmen gas, a deal that
promises to increase Turkmen gas shipments through
Russian pipelines over ten-fold. In May 2007, Russia,
Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan announced agreement on
plans to upgrade the Prikaspirski gas pipeline, ensuring in
effect that Russia will be able to virtually monopolize the
export of Turkmen gas for the foreseeable future. This deal,
announced while the EU has having its own energy summit
and occurring after rare US lobbying of Turkmenistan,
clearly demonstrated Russian inﬂuence in the region, a
force that the Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymu-
khanmedov (2007-) may deem important for his own do-
mestic political considerations.44
The Russians became far more active in Uzbekistan as
well, with Lukoil concluding a 35 year, $1 billion production
sharing agreement with the Uzbeks for the Kendym gas
ﬁelds and Gazprom pledging in 2005 to invest to
modernize the Ustyurt gas ﬁeld.45 With agreements in
2007 to refurbish gas pipelines from Uzbekistan, Russia is
well-positioned to be the major customer for Uzbek gas.
Lastly, even though Russia has not had the best relations
with Azerbaijan, it is notable that in 2005, when Western
governments were criticizing the Azerbaijani government
for unfair parliamentary elections, Russia came to the
support of Baku and Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, son of the
former president and former head of Azerbaijan’s State Oil43 “Russia Celebrates Its Central Asian Energy Coup,” Eurasianet.org, 16
May 2007.
44 It is worth noting that the Russians pay Turkmenistan less than half of
what Europeans pay Russians for the same volume of natural gas. The fact
that Turkmenistan accepts this deal, when one would imagine that other
export routes would be more lucrative, is a good indication that there is
much more to these deals than market economics.
45 EIA website.It is worth noting that the Russians pay Turkmenistan
less than half of what Europeans pay Russians for the same volume of
natural gas. The fact that Turkmenistan accepts this deal, when one
would imagine that other export routes would be more lucrative, is a
good indication that there is much more to these deals than market
economics..Company. With some Western companies pulling out of
projects in Azerbaijan after unsuccessful drillingdnoted
belowdRussian ﬁrms may be more willing investors in
future deals.3.2. America is set back
The United States, after looking like it was “winning” in
the Caspian Basin in the early 2000s, has more recently
experienced setbacks in the region. Part of the problem is
the more general issue of increasing hostility to the United
States in the wake of the Iraq war. However, in the Caspian
and Central Asian region in particulardwith the notable
exception of GeorgiadUS focus onmilitary questions in the
“war on terror” has failed to win the hearts and minds of
the population.46
Among states with major energy reserves, Azerbaijan
remains closest to the United States. With the BTC on-line
and a new gas pipeline deal with Turkey in the worksda
project that had major support from the United States-
dAzerbaijan has done more than any other state in the
region to pull away from Moscow’s orbit. Concerns about
authoritarian governance, corruption, and US support for
Armenia do complicate bi-lateral relations, but in general
there has been substantial cooperation in the energy sector.
One problem, however, may be that Azerbaijan may fail to
live up to its promise as an energy producer. Many in-
vestments did not pan out because drilling did not discover
major oil or gas deposits. Writing in 2003, Alec Rasizade
notes that
Of the remaining 16 projects, only ﬁve are actually in the
works. Of the pledged $42 billion, no more than $8 billion
was invested in Azerbaijan in the past decade. Of the ﬁve
working international consortia, only one, the AIOC
(Azerbaijan International Operating Company) led by
British Petroleum is currently producing considerable
amount of crude oil, not only incomparable with the Per-
sian Gulf levels, but even not justifying the construction of
a new main export pipeline [BTC].47
Indeed, in its ﬁrst full year of existence, BTC transported
only 143 million barrels of oil, only about a seventh of its
long-range potential.48
Consequently, the focus has turned to Kazakhstan in the
hopes that the Kazakhs will participate in the BTC and
consequently move away from Russia. However, this is far
from certain. In the ﬁrst place, although Kazakhstan ex-
pects to need more foreign investment to develop its re-
serves, changes in the law in 2005 require that Kazmunai
Gaz, a Kazakh state-owned company, must own at least 51
percent of the shares of any production-sharing agreement
and that it will be contracted for all offshore agreements.
Changes in tax policy in 2004–2005 also work against
foreign investors. Thus, any expectation that US companies
will dominate the energy sector in Kazakhstan are likely to46 Washington Post, 26 January 2006.
47 Alec Rasizade, “Azerbaijan after the First Decade of Capitalism,”
Central Asia and the Caucasus (June 2003), p. 105. See also Rutledge, 2005.
48 Wall Street Journal, 9 August 2007.
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panies such as Gazprom, which in many respects are ap-
pendages of the Russian government, may be more
concerned about geopolitics than proﬁts, an unfavorable
climate for investment in Kazakhstanwould likely favor the
Russians.
The question of pipelines is even more up in the air.
Kazakhstan will need more export routes. For example, if
current projections hold, the Kashagan ﬁeld will produce
up to 1.5 millions of barrel of oil a day by 2019. How will
this oil be shipped to world markets? One idea has been to
put oil into barges at the Kazakh port of Kuryk and ship it
across the Caspian and into the BTC. This, however, is rather
unwieldy and may not be cost effective. An undersea
pipeline route, which was avidly discussed in the 1990s,
would likely have a host of legal and environmental prob-
lems. In early 2007 several companies formed Kazakhstan
Caspian Transport System (included Chevron, ExxonMobil,
Agip, Total, Lukarco, and Kazmunaigaz) that seemed
committed to a western-oriented export route.49 At the
same time, however, the Kazakhs are keeping plenty of
options openwith respect to Russia, which in 2006 handled
over 80 percent of Kazakh oil exports. While the projected
output on Kazakhstan may necessitate multiple export
routes, it seems likely that Russia will remain Kazakhstan’s
primary outlet. Indeed, Nazarbaev himself was quoted in
2007 as saying that Kazakhstan is “absolutely committed to
funneling the bulk of our hydrocarbons, if not all, via Rus-
sia’s territory.”50
With respect toTurkmenistan,USofﬁcials observe that “if
the market decides,” Turkmen gas will make its way to
Europe via Azerbaijan.51 Indeed, this seems accurate, insofar
as theTurkmengovernmentwouldprobably receiveahigher
price for its gas if it was not shipped via Russian pipelines.
The fact, however, is that markets alonewill NOT decide this
issue. True, Ashgabat may hope to gain some leverage vis-à-
visMoscow bymaking some pledges to sell gas to China and
issuing statements, such as that by Turkmen President Ber-
dymukhanmedov in 2007 that a trans-Caspian gas pipeline
is “still on the table,”52 but most indicatorsdabove all,
existing and planned pipeline routesdsuggest that
Turkmenistan remains ﬁrmly linked to Russia. Doubly-
landlocked Uzbekistan, the other major gas supplier on the
eastern side of the Caspian, is, as of 2007, even less the object
of talks about a western-directed export route. US-Uzbek
relations, which showed great promise after 9/11, reached
a nadir in 2006, when the Uzbeks requested that American
military forces leave bases in Uzbekistan.
Overall, contrary to expectations immediately after 9/11,
the US position in the region, Azerbaijan excepted, has
eroded. Due to geography and the domestic political situ-
ation in several Caspian region states, the United States is,
comparatively speaking, seen as a less attractive partner.49 “Kazakhstan Eyes New Oil Export Route Via Caspian Sea,” Eurasianet.
org, 11 April 2007.
50 “Russia Celebrates,” 2007.
51 “New Gas Pipeline,” 2007.
52 “Russia Registers Victory in Caspian Basin Energy Game,” Eurasianet.
org, May 14, 2007.3.3. China casts a longer shadow
Whereas Chinese involvement in the region was a
somewhat “silent presence”53 in the ﬁrst decade after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, China’s role has become far
more prominent since 2003. Indeed, given geography,
China’s growing demand for energy,54 and the perception
that the Chinese are the least threatening outside actor (as
opposed to Russia or the United States), it has excellent
prospects in the Caspian basin and Central Asia.
As noted earlier, China entered into the region largely
through the SCO, which initially was most concerned about
security issues. However, with Chinese impetus, the SCO
has also established an energy working group, a clear effort
to create a multi-lateral forum to draw China into the
politics of energy and, implicitly, compete with the Russian
bilateral approach. As noted in an earlier chapter in this
volume as well, SCOdviewed by some as a new “NATO of
the East”55dhas also become far more assertive in the re-
gion vis-à-vis the United States, arguing the beneﬁts of
multi-polarity, which, for local states that do not want to be
the client of a great power, is no doubt attractive. On its
own, China has also concluded some major energy deals: a
$600 million loan to Uzbekistan to upgrade energy facil-
ities; purchase in 2005 of the Canadian company Petro-
Kazakhstan by the Chinese National Petroleum Company,
which gives China control over 12% of Kazakh oil output56;
the opening of the 600 mile long Atasu-Alashankou Pipe-
linedpart of a longer pipeline that is still under con-
structiondthat in 2007will deliver up to 200,000 barrels of
Kazakh oil a year; and negotiations in 2007 to conclude a
production-sharing agreement for the potentially very
large (11 billion barrels) Darkhan ﬁelds in Kazakhstan.57
Interestingly, Chinese involvement is motivated in part
because of frustration with Russia in providing China with
sufﬁcient energy supplies.58
It is in the gas sector, however, that the Chinese have
been the most active. In 2006, Beijing signed a thirty-year
agreement with Turkmenistan to purchase up to 30
billion cubic meters of gas a year (starting in 2009) and
committed itself in principle to develop a pipeline from
Turkmenistan. In April 2007, China and Uzbekistan agreed
to build a 300 mile gas pipeline to China (most likely
traversing Kazakhstan as well) that could export up to 30
billion cubic meters of gas a year, half of Uzbekistan’s cur-
rent output. Whether Uzbekistan can deliver this quantity
of gas is questionable, given its pledges to sell gas to Gaz-
prom and the fact that over 80% of Uzbekistan’s gas pro-
duction is consumed domestically, not exported. Moreover,
the Chinese ﬁrm Sinopec pulled out of a joint venture with
Uzbekistan in 2006 because of a tax increase in53 Olcott, 2005, p. 335.
54 Until 1993, China was an oil exporter. By 2003, it was the world’s
second-largest importer of oil.
55 Christian Science Monitor, October 26, 2005.
56 Moscow Times, August 23, 2005.
57 EIA Website, Moscow Times, August 23, 2005.
58 Stephen Blank, “China Makes Policy Shift, Aiming to Wider Access to
Central Asian Energy,” Eurasianet.org, March 13, 2006.
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not Europe, that has got commitments from these two
major gas producers, despite intense European lobbying to
build trans-Caspian pipelines to ship Turkmen or Uzbek gas
westward.
How all this will play out is very unclear. With pipeline
deals in the works with both Russia and China, Uzbekistan
and Turkmenistanmay be trying to play the two powers off
each other, looking to use one to get a better price for gas
from the other. At minimum, however, Chinese involve-
ment in the gas sector will signiﬁcantly reduce Moscow’s
(and Gazprom’s) power in the region.
4. Conclusions
While the global economic slowdown in the late 2000s
depressed demand and prices for energy, competition over
energy reserves in the Caspian Basinwill no doubt continue
for many more years. Its dynamics depend upon a number
of factors, including security issues, global energy demand,
domestic politics within the region, and the strategies of
external actors. What is striking, however, is that no
outside power has been able to establish dominance in the
region. Instead, one sees that the competition among
external actors has given local states signiﬁcant freedom to
maneuver, as they can look to the states that will give them
the best “deal”dboth in terms of energy and secur-
ity60dand shift allegiances as conditions change. This is
clearest in the cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
Kazakhstan, the most economically successful of all the
Caspian states, has been able to make major deals with a
number of outside actors. Although it cannot escape its
geography and reliance on Russia, it is no Russian puppet.
Its deals with Western governments and companies, as
well as a burgeoning relationship with China, give it a
stronger hand to play vis-à-vis Moscow. Indeed, if in the
early 1990s one could speak of Russian coercion against
Kazakhstan, over time the relationship has become far
more cooperative. The same, although on an even more
obvious level, can be said of Uzbekistan. Although Uzbe-
kistan brieﬂy became an important ally of the United States,
concerns over the US political agenda have pushed it back
towardMoscow and, especially in the energy sector, toward
Beijing. Indeed, the fact that Uzbek President Islam Kar-
imov received a twenty-one gun salute during a visit to
Beijing in June 2005dwhen his government was anathema
in the Westdreﬂects how more purely political concerns
can affect energy politics in the region.
The situations with respect to Azerbaijan and
Turkmenistan seem more resolved, but in neither of these59 “Uzbekistan Looks to Diversify Its Energy Options,” Eurasianet.org,
June 6, 2007.
60 For more on security arrangements in the region, see Yerena N.
Zabortseva, “From the ‘forgotten region’ to the ‘great game’ region: On the
development of geopolitics in Central Asia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies
3(2) 2012: 168–176.cases should one assume that these states have been “won”
by an external actor. Although Azerbaijan, largely for
geographical reasons, has been able to tilt more than any
other Caspian energy producer to the West, it retains ties
(including oil and gas export routes) with Russia. Poten-
tially, Western efforts to push a democratization agenda on
Baku could, as arguably has occurred with the Kazakhs and
Uzbeks push the Azeris, closer to Moscow. As for
Turkmenistan, its relative isolation and bizarre leadership
under Niyazov hampered its ability to engage outside ac-
tors. With Niyazov gone, Turkmenistan, while still close to
Russia, has concluded deals with the Chinese and remains a
major target of Iranian interest. Even though its past and
present leadersmay be loath to act upon them, it does, so to
speak, have options.
Although no observer has a crystal ball to forecast
accurately the future, if pressed to make a prediction, it
seems safe to conclude that Russia and China have the best
prospects in the region. Russia has too much of a
geographic advantage and a far greater ability to meddle
in the domestic politics of Caspian and Central Asian
states, all of which must be sensitive to Russian policy.
This does not mean that the region will become Russian-
dominated, largely because Russia lacks the capacity to
impose its will, a point made recently in the pages of this
journal.61 Setbacks for Russia include Bulgaria’s with-
drawal from the Burgas–Alexandroupoli pipeline project,
more intensive EU interest in building upgrades to the
Odessa–Brody pipeline for Caspian oil, the refusal of its
ostensible SCO allies to support its actions in the 2008 war
with Georgia and subsequently recognize South Ossetian
independence.
Meanwhile, given China’s growing economic clout and
thirst for energy, it is poised to be increasingly involved
with the region. It offers an attractive market and source for
investment, pledged $10 billion in aid for Central Asia at the
SCO summit in 2009, is the destination for several proposed
pipelines, and it is likely to be more tolerant of non-
democratic practices. Its security norms also correspond
well with the priorities of Central Asian governments.62
As for the United States and the West in general, it will
certainly be involved in various energy projects, but,
despite the wishes of some, the Caspian Region will not be
on American radar screens the same way that, for example,
the Persian Gulf is. While it certainly will not be pushed out
of the region, it cannot push othersdwho have various
geographic, economic, or political advantagesdout either.
Perhaps more than any other region in the world, the
Caspian and Central Asia will be the site for geo-political
pluralism.61 Martin Spechler and Dina Spechler, “Russia’s Lost Position in Central
Eurasia,” Journal of Eurasian Studies 4(1) 2013: 1–7.
62 This is a point made by Emilian Kavalski in his comparative study of
the EU, China, and India in the region. See his Central Asia and the Rise of
Normative Powers (London: Continuum 2012).
